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This paper examines the use of audience-directed or inherently communicative ex-
pressions (discourse markers and interjections) in free indirect thought represen-
tations in fiction. It argues that the insights of Banfield’s (1982) no-narrator approach
to free indirect style can be accommodated in a relevance theoretic framework. The
result is an account in which the author’s act of revealing a character’s thoughts
communicates a guarantee of optimal relevance – a guarantee which justifies the
eﬀort which the reader invests in deriving meta-representations of those thoughts
from the evidence which the author provides. However, the reward for this eﬀort
is a meta-representation of a character’s thoughts which is unmediated by the
thoughts of the author who is responsible for producing the text. Using examples
from fiction, I show that within this framework, the use of procedurally encoded
discourse markers and interjections contribute to this sense of immediacy by
imposing constraints on interpretation which leave the reader with the responsi-
bility for deriving his own interpretations of a character’s thoughts and thought
processes.
1. EXPRES S I V I TY MARKERS IN FREE IND IRECT THOUGHT
Within relevance theory it has been argued that the meanings of a subset
of the expressions labelled ‘discourse markers’, including standard cases of
Gricean conventional implicature (however, therefore, moreover), should be
analysed in terms of the way they constrain or direct pragmatic inference
rather than the way they contribute to the conceptual content of the
utterances that contain them (Blakemore 1987, 2002). This distinction be-
tween procedural and conceptual meaning reflects the representational/
computational approach to cognition which underpins Sperber & Wilson’s
(1995) relevance theoretic approach to utterance interpretation. However, it
is also justified in terms of the pragmatic principle which, according to rel-
evance theory, is essential for the explanation of how human communication
[1] I am extremely grateful to Nigel Fabb and two anonymous JL referees for comments on
earlier versions of this paper. Obviously, they are not to be held responsible for any of the
arguments it contains.
J. Linguistics, Page 1 of 25. f Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0022226709990375
1
is achieved. According to this principle, every act of ostensive communi-
cation communicates a guarantee of optimal relevance so that it may be
assumed that the communicator has aimed to achieve the highest level of
relevance he is capable of within the parameters of his abilities and interests.
Since the degree of relevance increases with the number of cognitive eﬀects
derived and decreases with the amount of processing eﬀort required for their
derivation, the use of an expression which encodes a procedure for identify-
ing the intended cognitive eﬀects would be advantageous from a processing
point of view: it provides a means of ensuring the identification of the in-
tended cognitive eﬀects for a minimum cost in eﬀort.2
On this approach, expressions which encode procedures rather than con-
cepts are intrinsically linked to communication: their function is to reduce
the eﬀort which the hearer must invest in recovering the intended interpret-
ation of an utterance. In real life, communicators produce public re-
presentations (utterances) of their private thoughts, and hearers are intended
to use the linguistic properties of these utterances and contextual assump-
tions in the derivation of interpretations of those thoughts. In fiction,
authors may REPRESENT fictional acts of communication in which fictional
speakers are represented as producing utterances which readers are meant to
assume are interpreted by fictional hearers. Clearly, there is a limit to the
extent to which these representations of fictional acts of communication re-
semble actual acts of communication. An author may attempt an ortho-
graphic indication of a character’s accent (see Fludernik 1993: 259–260), or
orthographic representations of features such as emphatic stress. But in
general the representation is a less than verbatim record of the utterance
which the character is supposed to have made.3 Nevertheless, according to
the relevance theoretic framework of this paper, an author who is re-
presenting a character engaged in the act of communication must be assumed
to be representing someone who is aiming at optimal relevance. This means
that it is not particularly surprising that fictional communicators are re-
presented as using expressions which encode procedures, or, in other words,
expressions which are inherently communicative in the sense outlined above.
The only diﬀerence is that in such cases the expression is linked to a re-
presented act of communication rather than an actual one.
However, in free indirect thought (FIT) these ‘ intrinsically communicative ’
or audience-directed devices are used by writers in their representations of
thoughts which must be attributed to characters who are not engaged in
an act of communication at all. For example, in (1) well must be attributed to
[2] For further discussion see Blakemore 2002, Wilson & Sperber 1993.
[3] Fludernik (1993) argues that representations of utterances can only be representations of
utterance types and that all speech and thought representation relies on a mechanism of
schematization which is independent of actual thought processes.
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Mansfield’s character Linda Burnell, who is represented as simply thinking
(underlining in this example and the ones which follow is my own):
(1) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her
children._ Even if she had the strength she would never had nursed
and played with the little girls. No, it was as though a cold breath had
chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys; she
had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank heaven,
mother had taken him.
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, p. 223)
Similarly, in (2), anywaymust be attributed to Grace’s character, Rua, who is
engaged not in the act of communication, but in the act of thought :
(2) Not long after sunrise he’d thrown his line out and spent about an hour
before catching two fish, then he’d scaled and cleaned them, washed
up, taken his time coming back. Probably getting on for eight o’clock.
Anyway, it was all his own doing, getting her to come here. Why
had he?
(Patricia Grace, Dogside Story, p. 75)
Discourse markers are amongst a whole range of expressions and struc-
tures found in FIT which are said to function as markers of expressivity or
subjectivity (Banfield 1982, Fludernik 1993). These include a heterogeneous
class of items, usually called interjections, some of which are considered to be
marginal to language. Examples include ah in (3), oh in (4), good heavens in
(5) and Linda Burnell’s no in (1) :
(3) Linda was astonished at the confidence of this little creature_ Ah, no,
be sincere. That was not what she felt ; it was something far diﬀerent, it
was something so new, so_
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, p. 223)
(4) Oh, how marvellous to have a brother ! In her excitement Leila felt that
if there had been time, if it hadn’t been impossible, she couldn’t have
helped crying because she was an only child and no brother had ever
said ‘Twig?’ to her; no sister would ever say, as Meg said to Jose at that
moment, ‘I’ve never known your hair go up more successfully than it
has tonight ’.
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘Her First Ball ’, Collected Stories, p. 337)
(5) And once too in his studio, where the Consul was so obviously not
going to arrive, M. Laruelle had shown her some stills of his old French
films, one of which it turned out – good heavens! – she’d seen in New
York.
(Malcolm Lowry, Under the Volcano, p. 267)
Since these expressions signify feelings or states of minds rather than concepts
which can be explicated, they cannot be straightforwardly accommodated in
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a translational semantics for natural language (cf. Kaplan 1997; Wharton
2003a, b). Thus Kaplan (1997) argues that, in contrast with words such as
fortnight and feral, these expressions encode information about the contexts
in which they are appropriate, or, in other words, that they require a
SEMANTICS OF USE rather than a SEMANTICS OF MEANINGS. And within a rel-
evance theoretic framework, Wharton (2003a, b) has argued that while in-
terjections such as ah and oh may not be properly linguistic, they nevertheless
have a coded element which is procedural in the sense that they are used by
speakers in order to encourage the hearer to construct conceptual re-
presentations of the emotions and attitudes they wish to communicate.4
However, the interjections in (3)–(5) above are all attributable to characters
who are engaged not in acts of communication but in acts of thought. While
one can see why a communicator might use an expression which encourages
a hearer/reader to construct a meta-representation of the emotions he is
experiencing, it seems diﬃcult to see how such an expression could play a
role in thought.
The question, then, is how can we justify the use of expressions which,
according to the relevance theoretic approach outlined above, are not con-
stituents of thoughts in representations of the thoughts of characters who are
engaged in private thought rather than communication?
There is no question that this must be justified. The authors cited above
cannot be accused of doing something which is somehow illegitimate. As we
shall see in this paper, these expressions play an important role in creating an
impression of being able to gain entry to a character’s mind, or of being able
to witness him/her as s/he is actually having the thoughts in much the same
way that we are able to witness a speaker as he constructs utterances as
public representations of his own thoughts. This eﬀect is often encapsulated
in the description of FIT as ‘ inner speech’ (cf. Chatman 1978, Ehrlich 1990).
However, as I have just argued, this is not ‘speech’ in the sense of an act
of communication intended for a hearer. It is not represented speech, but
represented thought.
Here we have the key to the answer to the question I have just posed. The
point is that these are public REPRESENTATIONS of thoughts, and these cannot
be confused with the private thoughts they represent. The fact that the use of
expressions such as well, anyway, ah and oh gives us access to the minds of
the characters whose thoughts are being represented does not mean that
these expressions are actually constituents of the thoughts being represented.
[4] Potts (2007) has applied this sort of approach to expressive APs and NP epithets. His
argument is that these expressions should be treated as devices for situating the utterances
which contain them within the discourse, or as operators which change the context in
specific ways. Since these expressions are also a characteristic feature of free indirect
thought representations, it would seem that my discussion of the role of interjections in FIT
may be extended to include expressive APs (e.g. bloody, damn) and NP epithets (the
bastard).
D IANE BLAKEMORE
4
It might seem that the point I am making here is no diﬀerent from the
point that utterances made by communicating speakers should not be con-
fused with the thoughts they represent, and hence that the presence of ex-
pressions such as well, anyway, ah and oh in FIT deserves no more
explanation than their presence in any utterance which communicates the
speaker’s thoughts. However, this paper assumes that there is a diﬀerence
between the two cases. An utterance made in the course of real-life (or, in-
deed, simulated) communication is evidence of the communicator’s intention
that the audience should derive an interpretation which is a representation of
that communicator’s thoughts. The speaker is communicating HIS thoughts.
As we shall see, he may entertain a thought as a representation of another
person’s thoughts, in which case the utterance can be said to be used attri-
butively. But it is still the SPEAKER who is entertaining this thought as a
representation of another thought.
A FIT representation, on the other hand, is simply intended as a rep-
resentation of someone else’s thoughts. In producing a FIT representation,
the author cannot be understood to be communicating his thoughts, but
must simply be taken to be representing thoughts which are being en-
tertained by another. In other words, a FIT representation is unmediated by
the thoughts of a communicating speaker.
In this paper, I argue that the use of discourse markers and expressive
interjections in FIT representations must be explained in terms of an ap-
proach to FIT which is able to capture this diﬀerence. In section 2, I outline
the relevance theoretic approach to attributively used utterances and argue
that it does not capture the diﬀerence between communicated thought and
represented thought just outlined. In section 3, I address the question of
whether the use of expressive devices in FIT can serve as a means of distin-
guishing FIT representations from indirect thought representations. In sec-
tion 4, I argue for a relevance theoretic account of FIT representations which
departs from the one suggested by Wilson (2006) in terms of tacit attributive
use. And in section 5, I show how this approach serves as the basis for the
explanation of the use of discourse markers, expletives and interjections in
FIT representations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. RELEVANCE AND META-REPRESENTAT ION
Within relevance theory, Wilson (1995, 2000) have shown that the ability to
form meta-representations or representations of representations is funda-
mental to the explanation of linguistic communication. In the first place,
since an utterance is a public representation which has a propositional form,
it can be used to represent another representation which has a propositional
form – or, in other words, a thought. However, utterances do not com-
municate thoughts by duplicating them. All we can say is that utterances
INTERPRET the thoughts they are used to communicate (Sperber & Wilson
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1995: 230). An utterance is an interpretation of a thought to the extent that
its propositional form resembles the communicator’s thought, or, in other
words, to the extent that it shares logical and contextual implications with
that thought. The more implications they share, the closer the resemblance,
and identity is simply a special case of resemblance, in which the prop-
ositional form of the utterance shares all the implications of the thought in
every context.
The hearer’s task in interpreting this utterance is to use the utterance as a
means of deriving a representation of the speaker’s thought – a thought
about a thought. However, once again it is not assumed that the represen-
tation derived by the hearer duplicates that thought. The hearer must use
pragmatic inference to bridge the gap between the linguistically encoded
meaning of the utterance and its interpretation. Since the linguistic evidence
provided by the utterance may give the hearer varying degrees of responsi-
bility for deriving an interpretation which satisfies his expectations of rel-
evance, it is possible that he will use the utterance as a means for deriving
assumptions which are not identical with ones envisaged by the speaker.
That is, the thoughts derived by the hearer will simply be assumed to be an
interpretation of the speaker’s thoughts, and communication will succeed to
the extent that it results in the enlargement of the mutual cognitive en-
vironment of speaker and hearer.5
However, as Sperber & Wilson show, the thought represented by an
utterance may itself be entertained by the speaker as a representation of
another (attributed) thought. Consider the summary of a speech, or the
minutes of a meeting, or a report made by a speaker of another person’s
utterance or thought attributed made by another. Once again the intention is
not necessarily to replicate that utterance or thought. Even so-called direct
representations do not necessarily reproduce the original exactly. The fol-
lowing was heard in a reading of a story for children (BBC Radio 7) :
(6) ‘Who said you could put your bottom on my chair ’, he said – except he
didn’t use the word bottom.
Similar examples are given by Wilson (2000). In the narrratology literature,
the idea that direct discourse is a verbatim representation of the original
has also been exposed as a myth (see Sternberg 1982, Fludernik 1993). Thus
Fludernik (1993: 409–410) cites both non-literary (oral) and literary examples
[5] Sperber & Wilson (1995) define the COGNITIVE ENVIRONMENT of an individual as the set of
assumptions which are MANIFEST to an individual at a given time, where MANIFESTNESS is
defined in terms of the degree to which an individual is capable of representing an as-
sumption and holding it as true or probably true at a given time. A MUTUAL COGNITIVE
ENVIRONMENT is a cognitive environment which is shared by a number of individuals and in
which it is manifest to those individuals that they share it with each other.
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of cases in which a narrator attributes a thought or statement to characters
who have not uttered a word.
(7) And I just felt like, ‘This is where I belong’. (from Tannen 1989: 152)
(8) An approving murmur arose from the heads of tribes ; as saying, ‘There
you have him! Hold him!’
(Charles Dickens, Our Mutual Friend I, xi, p. 187)
As Wilson (2000) points out, languages have a variety of devices available
to speakers for indicating attributive intentions – for example, parenthetical
clauses such as ‘he thought ’ or ‘he said’, hearsay sentence adverbials such as
‘allegedly’ or ‘according to Pam’, hearsay particles, prepositions, and
modals.6 However, in many cases, the speaker’s intentions are not indicated
by the form of his utterance and the hearer will have to use pragmatic in-
ference to work out that an utterance is intended as a representation of an
attributed thought. For example, in (9) below, the speaker’s use of the sen-
tence adverbial according to Pam indicates that the thought which is inter-
preted by the segment in (b) is being entertained as a representation of Pam’s
thought, and hence that the hearer should recover the higher-level ex-
plicature in (11). However, in (10), the attribution is tacit and the hearer is
intended to infer that the utterance is being used attributively on the basis of
the context and the Principle of Relevance:
(9) (a) I thought it was really nice. (b) But according to Pam, I looked
ridiculous.
(10) [The speaker, who has been trying on a dress in a shop, emerges from
the changing cubicle and looks questioningly at her friend who pre-
pares herself to say something tactful]
Friend: Well,_
Speaker: I look ridiculous.
(11) Pam thinks I look ridiculous.
According to Wilson (2006), free indirect speech and thought can be
treated along the same lines as (10), as a tacitly attributive uses of language.
Thus she argues that the second segment of (12) will be misunderstood if it is
not understood that the speaker is thinking about what the students are
thinking rather thinking directly about a particular state of aﬀairs.
(12) (a) The students were thoughtful. (b) If they didn’t act now, it would be
too late.
(from Wilson 2006: 1730, ex. (12))
[6] For further discussion of the various devices used to indicate attributive intentions, see
Blass (1989, 1990), Ifantidou-Trouki (1993), Wilson & Sperber (1993).
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In fact, as Banfield (1982: 76–88), Ehrlich (1982: 76–88) and Fludernik
(1993: 165, 240–241, 285–297) have pointed out, authors who provide FIT
representations may use parentheticals to explicitly indicate the source of the
represented thought and its mode of representation. The example in (13) is
cited by Ehrlich (1990), while (14)–(16) are cited in Blakemore (2008) :7
(13) Her shoes were excellent, he observed.
(Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse, p. 22)
(14) Human relations were all like that, she thought, and the worst (if it had
not been for Mr Bankes) were between men and women.
(Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse, p. 107)
(15) Yvonne knew where she was now, but the two alternatives, the two
paths, stretched out before her on either side like the arms – the oddly
dislocated thought struck her – of a man being crucified.
(Malcolm Lowry, Under the Volcano, p. 319)
(16) So the ‘other ’ had come again. And now gone, he thought: but no, not
quite, for there was still something there, in some way connected with
it, or here, at his elbow, or behind his back, in front of him now_
(Malcolm Lowry, Under the Volcano, p. 96)
However, whether or not the source of the represented thought is indicated
by a parenthetical, it seems that FIT representations must be distinguished
from utterances such as (9) or (10). Notice that although the speaker of (10)
will be understood to be using his utterance attributively, the attributed
thought it is being used to represent is nevertheless being viewed from the
speaker’s perspective. As Reinhart (1983) and Ehrlich (1990) have pointed
out, whereas in free indirect thought representations it has to be assumed
that the person whose thought is being represented actually had that thought
(or one something like it), this is not the case in indirect thought re-
presentations. Thus in (10), the speaker may have simply inferred that Pam
had the thought that he looked ridiculous on the basis of his observations of
Pam’s behaviour.
Moreover, whereas in tacit indirect thought the speaker may use an ex-
pressive to indicate that the attributed thought is being seen from his own
point of view, in free indirect thought, expressives must be attributed to the
character whose thoughts are represented. For example, while Pam can be
[7] As Reinhart (1983) has shown, sentences containing parentheticals which indicate the
source of a free indirect style thought or speech representation and its mode of represen-
tation are characterized by backward pronominalization and tense agreement. In contrast,
in sentences containing parentheticals which indicate the source of a thought/speech rep-
resentation from the speaker’s point of view, forward pronominalization is obligatory and
the tense of the main clause is determined in relation to real time. For further discussion, see
Ehrlich (1990).
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attributed with the thought that the speaker looks ridiculous in (17), the
expletive can be attributed to the speaker:
(17) [The speaker emerges from a changing cubicle in a clothes shop and
looks questioningly at Pam who prepares herself to say something
tactful]
Pam: Well,_
Speaker: Oh God I look ridiculous.
Similarly, in (18), while the speaker will be understood to be attributing the
thought that she looks ridiculous to someone else (Pam), she must be
understood as the source of the discourse marker so :
(18) [The speaker emerges from a changing cubicle in a clothes shop and
sees the look of shocked disapproval on her friend’s face]
So I look ridiculous. Is there anything in this shop you approve of?
In contrast, in the constructed FIT examples in (19) and (20), My God and
so must be attributed to the person whose thoughts are being represented,
and we are intended to view these thoughts from the perspective of that
person:
(19) My God, how ridiculous he looked.
(20) So he had come.
The fact that that in tacitly attributed utterances, expletives and discourse
markers can be attributed to the speaker who is attributing the represented
thought rather than to the person whose thought is being represented
suggests that we are intended to understand that this thought is being
viewed from the perspective of the speaker rather than the source of
the attributed thought. However, the fact that the expressives in (19) and
(20) must be attributed to the character whose thought is being rep-
resented suggests that we are intended to view this thought from the per-
spective of this person rather than the speaker who is responsible for
representing it.
3. PROCEDURAL MEAN ING IN IND IRECT THOUGHT REPORTS
The presence of expressive devices in free indirect thought representations
is often contrasted with their absence in indirect thought representations.
Thus for example, while good heavens is acceptable in the FIT passage
in (5), it cannot be interpreted as falling under the scope of the verb think
in (21) :
(21) ?She thought that good heavens she had seen it in New York.
However, it seems that the question of whether these devices can occur in
indirect discourse is far from straightforward. Thus both Fludernik (1993)
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and Potts (2007) have shown that expletives and expressive epithets can fall
under the scope of certain verbs in indirect speech reports:
(22) Mr Sparkler, growing rash on his late success, observed that Edward
had, biggod, a long bout of it,_
(Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit I, xxiv, p. 762,
cited by Fludernik 1993: 239; my underlining)
(23) My father screamed that he would never allow me to marry that bas-
tard Webster. However, I would never have gone out with him if I had
thought he was a bastard.
(adapted from example due to A. Kratzer, cited
by Potts 2007: 7, ex. (15) ; my underlining)
Moreover, as Rieber, (1997), Bach (1999) and Potts (2005) have shown, cer-
tain discourse markers which have been analysed in procedural terms may
fall within the scope of indirect thought reports. (24) is based on an example
from Wilson & Sperber (1993), while (25) is from Potts (2005):
(24) Henry thought that Sue had had holiday and so he should have one
too.
(25) Marv thinks that Shaq is huge but [that he is] agile.
If expressives and discourse markers fall within the scope of indirect thought
reports, as these examples suggest, then it would seem that there is one less
argument from distinguishing free indirect discourse from standard indirect
discourse.8
Examples such as (22) and (23) might be dismissed as unproblematic since
they can be treated as cases of implicit direct quotation (see Hall 2007 for
discussion). This, however, is not an option in indirect thought reports, since
the subject cannot be understood to have produced an utterance, and it
seems that the assumption that ejectives and expressive epithets cannot fall
within the scope of indirect thought reports must hold. Notice that in con-
trast with (23), the speaker’s dissociation from the epithet in the second
segment of the indirect thought report in (26) is odd:
(26) My father thinks that I shouldn’t marry that bastard Webster.
?However, I would never have gone out with him if I had thought he
was a bastard.
[8] See Schlenker (2004) and Sharvit (2008) for discussion of the question of whether free
indirect discourse is more like direct discourse than indirect discourse from the perspective
of formal semantics, and in particular, from the perspective of the interpretation of tense,
pronouns, and other indexicals (e.g. here, now, that). See below (section 4) for discussion of
Schlenker’s solution to the puzzle of free indirect discourse.
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However, this leaves us with the examples in (24) and (25) where, it seems,
so and but fall within the scope of the indirect thought report. If, as Bach
(1999) has argued, the speaker of these utterances is attributing thought
contents, then it would seem that so and but would have to be analysed
as contributing to those contents rather than as audience directed devices
for constraining interpretation. And indeed, Potts (2005: 39) has argued that
the fact that but must be regarded as part of the utterance’s truth conditional
or ‘at issue’ content explains why the entirety of its content is attributed, not
to the speaker, but to the subject of the verb of saying or thinking when it is
used in an indirect speech or thought report.
Bach’s (1999) solution focuses on utterances containing but, which, he
claims, express multiple propositions, all of which are part of its truth con-
ditional content. Thus an utterance such as (27) expresses the propositions
in (28) :
(27) Shaq is huge but agile.
(28) (a) Shaq is huge.
(b) Shaq is agile.
(c) There is a certain contrast between being huge and agile.
The fact that but (c) does not seem to aﬀect the truth of (27), Bach argues, is
explained by saying that it is usually part of common ground and hence not
salient in assessments of truth or falsity. However, as Hall (2007) points out,
Bach’s account does not explain why the proposition that there is a contrast
happens to be backgrounded in all cases EXCEPT for speech and thought
reports.
In fact, it seems that there are uses of but and so which become unac-
ceptable when they are embedded in indirect thought reports. Consider, for
example, a situation in which Jane believes that Henry has gone shopping for
food and sees him return empty-handed. In this context, Jane might produce
the utterance in (29) :
(29) So we’ve got nothing for dinner.
Alternatively, Henry might anticipate Jane’s utterance and produce the in-
direct thought report in (30) :
(30) You think that we’ve got nothing for dinner.
However, he cannot produce the unacceptable indirect thought report
in (31) :
(31) ??You think that so we’ve got nothing for dinner.
Similar examples can be constructed for but. Thus in a context in which
Henry has asked Jane to distribute the handouts for a lecture, Jane’s
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utterance in (32) is acceptable, as is Henry’s indirect thought report in (33).
However, the indirect thought report in (34) is unacceptable :
(32) But there are not going to be enough.
(33) You think that there aren’t going to be enough.
(34) ??You think that but there aren’t going to be enough.
The point is, of course, that whatever explanation is given for the un-
acceptability of (31) or (34) would have to be consistent with the acceptability
of (29) or (32).
It seems that this explanation can be found in a procedural analysis of so
and but in the indirect thought reports in (24) and (25). As we have seen in
section 2, indirect thought reports are reports of what the SPEAKER thinks
about the subject’s thoughts, and these may include reports of how the
subject thinks specific propositions are related in an inference. Given that
the relevance of such a report lies in the speaker’s interpretation of what the
hearer thinks, then it is in the speaker’s interests that the hearer is able to
identify this interpretation on the basis of the utterance he makes. Since the
function of words such as but and so is to make particular inferential routes
accessible, one might expect a speaker who wishes to represent a subject as
thinking that propositions are related in a particular kind of inference to
use these words in order to ensure that the hearer derives the intended
interpretation of his utterance for a minimum cost in processing. The in-
terpretation recovered by the hearer on the basis of the meanings of each of
these expressions is an interpretation of the speaker’s interpretation of the
subject’s thoughts/inferences. However, this is not to say that the hearer will
attribute the speaker with the thought that the subject has a thought which
contains constituents corresponding to but or so. The hearer will attribute
the speaker with the thought that the subject can be attributed with the
thought that the propositions which are included within the scope of the
thought report are related in a particular kind of inference. The role of so or
but is simply to indicate what kind of inferential relationship this is.
Returning now to (29)–(31), we can see that the speaker of (29) (Jane) is
not expressing a thought about an inferential relationship, but is simply ex-
pressing a thought (that they have nothing for dinner) and indicating how it
achieves relevance (as a contextual implication from an assumption which
is assumed to be mutually manifest). It is, of course, possible for someone
(Henry) to attribute him with the thought which she has expressed (as in
(30)). However, since so does not contribute to the content of the thought
which Jane expresses in (29), but simply constrains the hearer’s interpret-
ation of it, it cannot be part of the thought content which Henry is attribut-
ing to her in (31). But nor is it being used to indicate how Jane thinks two
propositions are related in an inference. It is not surprising, then, that (31)
is unacceptable. The examples in (32)–(34) can be explained along similar
lines.
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4. THE REPRESENTAT ION OF THOUGHT IN F ICT ION: A RELEVANCE
THEORET IC RE-A S SE S SMENT
In contrast with the indirect thought reports in (31) and (34), the free indirect
thought reports in (35) and (36) are acceptable :
(35) So there would be nothing for dinner, she thought.
(36) But there were not going to be enough, she thought.
This brings us back to the question with which we began, and the main focus
of this paper : how do we account for the use of intrinsically communicative
devices in the representation of the thoughts of a subject not engaged in the
act of communication? In this section, I develop an account of free indirect
style which is based on Sperber & Wilson’s relevance theoretic approach
to communication, but which incorporates the insights of Banfield (1982),
who argues that the interpretation of a free indirect discourse text must be
contrasted with the interpretation of communicated discourse since its in-
terpretation does not require the identification of a (speaking) communicator
and a hearer, but simply the identification of the point of view (SELF) of the
character whose thoughts and utterances are being represented.
It might seem that such an account is impossible. Sperber & Wilson’s
theory is a theory of communication: interpretation is constrained by the
expectations of relevance which follow from the hearer’s recognition that an
act of ostensive communication has been performed. Banfield, on the other
hand, distinguishes narration and representation in fiction (the EXPRESSIVE
dimension of language) from communication (TEXT), where the speaker’s
very presence guarantees the possibility of I (cf. Banfield 2005: 396).
However, as we have seen, in relevance theory communication is defined in
pragmatic terms: the question of whether an act of ostensive communication
has been performed is not determined linguistically. Banfield’s distinction
between communication and the expressive dimension of language is, in
contrast, a LINGUISTIC distinction corresponding to the distinction between
language whose interpretation depends on the deictic centres SPEAKER and
HEARER (I and you), on the one hand, and language whose interpretation
depends on the deictic centre SELF (the point of view of the character whose
thoughts are being represented).
It seems that there is a similar distinction underlying Schlenker’s (2004)
proposals for the analysis of indexicals in free indirect discourse and
the historical present. Schlenker distinguishes between the CONTEXT OF
UTTERANCE (the point at which a thought is expressed) and CONTEXT OF
THOUGHT (the point at which a thought originates9), arguing that indexicals
must be classified according to the context with respect to which they are
evaluated. In particular, whereas the interpretation of tenses and pronouns
depend on the context of utterance, the interpretation of other indexicals
[9] This seems to correspond to what is called ‘point of view’ in the narratology literature.
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(e.g. now, here, yesterday, this, that) depends on the context of thought. In
ordinary (e.g. face-to-face) communication (Banfield’s I speaking to you)
these two contexts coincide. However, in free indirect discourse thought they
do not, thus creating the impression that another person’s thoughts are being
articulated through another person’s mouth.
Following Banfield and Schlenker, it seems that we could say that as they
are used in free indirect discourse, expressives depend for their interpretation
on the context of thought rather than the context of utterance. However, as
we shall see, not all aspects of the interpretation of a represented thought
depend on the context of thought, where this is defined as the point where the
thought originates. Many of the conclusions that we draw from such a rep-
resentation depend on contextual assumptions derived from our interpret-
ation of other character’s thoughts, and, in some cases, on the point of view
of the author (so-called ‘authorial intrusion’). Moreover, as Fludernik (1993)
shows, point of view is not always established linguistically. In some cases, it
is not possible to identify a reflecting character whose point of view is being
represented.10 Further, while expressive devices may evoke expressivity, the
actual subject of consciousness must be inferred pragmatically on the basis of
contextual assumptions made accessible by the text. Finally, as we have seen
in section 3, expressives are not restricted to free indirect discourse: they may
be embedded within the scope of indirect speech and thought reports.
Fludernik concludes that expressive elements must be treated as signals used
to ‘evoke subjectivity rather than a mere surface structure of underlying ac-
tual consciousness or SELF’ (1993: 398; emphasis in the original).
My proposal is that the distinction Banfield draws between communi-
cation and representation should in fact be drawn in pragmatics. Moreover,
in contrast with Banfield, I do not interpret this distinction as a distinction
between a non-communicative use of language and a communicative use.
Within a relevance theoretic framework, the representation of thought (and
speech) in fiction is a variety of ostensive communication.
Clearly, we would not expect the representation of the thought processes
of someone who does not have a communicative intention to capture the sort
of steps a communicator might take in order to satisfy a hearer’s expecta-
tions of optimal relevance. Hence the incoherence of thought representations
such as the one in (37) :
(37) Yet in the Earthly Paradise, what had he done? He had made few
friends. He had acquired a Mexican mistress with whom he quarrelled,
numerous beautiful Mayan idols he would be unable to take out of the
country, and he had – M. Laruelle wondered if it was going to rain.
(Malcolm Lowry, Under the Volcano, p. 16)
[10] See the discussion of the opening section of Mansfield’s ‘At the Bay’ in Fludernik (1993:
387–391).
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However, while we might not expect optimal relevance from M. Laruelle,
we do expect optimal relevance from the author who is representing this
thought. Lowry may not be communicating in the sense that he is TELLING us
what M. Laruelle was thinking: he is simply showing us M. Laruelle’s
thoughts. However, as Sperber & Wilson (1995: 52–53) have argued, even
where an act of showing provides strong direct evidence for the basic layer of
information (as in the case of opening a cupboard to let someone see the
contents), there is an intention to draw some attention to the fact that the
act was intentional and hence that the audience can assume that by paying
attention they will discover relevant information. Thus the author must be
assumed to communicate a guarantee that the eﬀort invested by the reader in
processing his text will be rewarded.
However, as Banfield has said, the author cannot be said to be speaking in
fiction in the sense that he is communicating his thoughts.11 Putting it in her
terms, the author does not ‘speak’ in the text, but rather ‘creates a fictional
world_ out of language, whether or not the language is attributed to a
narrator’ (Banfield 2005: 397). In texts with a narrator, the author can be
said to represent or show us the thoughts of a narrator who is communi-
cating with a narratee. In free indirect style texts, where there is no narrator,
the author can be said to represent or show us the thoughts of a character
who is either engaged in a fictional act of communication with another
character (free indirect speech) or simply engaged in private thought. It is the
latter sort of case which is the focus of this paper.
However, whether the reader is interpreting a text with a narrator or
not, the reward for the eﬀort he invests cannot lie in the improvement to
the mutual cognitive environment of author and reader, since the author is
showing us or representing the thoughts/utterances of another rather than
communicating his own thoughts. Instead the reward lies in the relationship
which is created between the reader and the fictional individuals in the fic-
tional world which the author is representing. And this is more like the re-
lationship that one might have with an individual whose life one is watching
on film – except, of course, that in the sort of case under discussion in this
paper, one has the impression of watching a film of an individual’s private
mental life. As Dillon & Kirchhoﬀ (1976: 438) say, ‘FIS [free indirect style] is
more often a strategy through which the narrator appears to withdraw from
the scene and thus present the illusion of a character acting out his mental
state in an immediate relationship with the reader’.
While the author may not have a ‘voice’ in the text, he is nevertheless
responsible for deciding what is shown to the reader and when it is shown.
[11] The exception is, of course, in cases of so-called authorial intrusion. However, as Banfield
(2005) points out, the fact that a text has authorial intrusions does not necessarily mean
that all of its sentences are attributable to an author-narrator. See below for Dillon &
Kirchhoﬀ’s (1976) discussion of an example from Conrad’s The Secret Agent.
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This means that the relationship just described is orchestrated by the author
so that while readers are sometimes encouraged to adopt an empathetic
attitude to the characters whose thoughts are being represented, in other
cases they are encouraged to adopt a negative attitude towards them. This is
achieved in a variety of ways. In some cases, the author simply lets a
character reveal his own defects. For example, in ‘Mr Reginald Peacock’s
Day’, Mansfield’s representation of Mr Peacock will lead most readers to the
conclusion that he is an extremely vain man, so that his claim that he cannot
stand vain men makes him seem all the more ridiculous. In other cases, an
author may create a feeling of dissociation from one character by encour-
aging us to see him through the eyes of another. Thus in ‘Prelude’, Mansfield
has us see Stanley Burnell do his exercises through the eyes of his wife Linda
(see Blakemore 2008 for further discussion). And as Dillon & Kirchoﬀ (1976)
show, an author may interrupt the representation of the thoughts of another
with an utterance which represents his own view (authorial intrusion). Thus
they argue that in the following extract from Conrad’s Secret Agent, the
utterance introduced by the sentence adverbial as a matter of fact indicates
a view which contrasts with that of the character whose thoughts are being
represented in the preceding segment: Mrs Verloc, who has just killed
her husband, is panicking and hysterical, while the narrator is cool and
detached:
(38) She looked up mechanically at the clock. She thought it must have
stopped. She could not believe that only two minutes had passed
since she had looked at it last. Of course not. It had been stopped all
the time. As a matter of fact, only three minutes had elapsed from the
moment she had drawn the first deep, easy breath after the blow, to this
moment when Mrs Verloc formed the resolution to drown herself in
the Thames.
(Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent, p. 238)
More generally, the representation of a character’s thought(s) must be
interpreted in the context of the whole text, which, as Ehrlich (1990) as em-
phasized, may represent the perspectives of a range of diﬀerent characters.
Thus the conclusions we derive from the representation of a given character’s
thoughts may be aﬀected by the interpretation of the representations of
the thoughts of another, or, indeed, by the thoughts revealed by the sort of
authorial intrusion discussed by Dillon & Kirchoﬀ.
5. FIT AND PROCEDURAL MEAN ING
In section 4, I have argued that what Banfield calls representation can be
distinguished from an act of communication performed by a speaker who
wishes to communicate his own thoughts. The latter communicates a
guarantee of the relevance of an interpretation which the hearer assumes is
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an interpretation of the speaker’s thoughts. The act of representation com-
municates a guarantee of the relevance of an interpretation which the reader
will take to be an interpretation of the thoughts of someone other than the
speaker – an individual whose identity must be established on the basis of
pragmatic inference. This interpretation is unmediated by the thoughts of the
speaker/writer responsible for producing the representation. In this section,
I will show how this distinction allows us to account for the use of ex-
pressions which, according to relevance theory, do not occur as constituents
of thoughts, in the representations of the thoughts of non-communicating
subjects.
5.1 Discourse markers in FIT
As we have seen, according to relevance theoretic accounts, discourse mar-
kers such as well in (39) (extracted from (1) above) and in (40), and after all in
(41) are inherently communicative or audience directed:
(39) And what made it doubly hard to bear was, she did not love her
children._ Even if she had the strength she would never had nursed
and played with the little girls. No, it was a though a cold breath had
chilled her through and through on each of those awful journeys ; she
had no warmth left to give them. As to the boy – well, thank heaven,
mother had taken him.
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, p. 223)
(40) He said what he usually said, ‘A shark got it ’. Said it loud and it shut
her up._Well the other thing was, that after they’d told you about
their diseases, their depressions and their stuﬀed relationships – after
they’d come to an end of talking about themselves, they’d always want
to know. Payback time.
(Patricia Grace, Dogside Story, p. 49)
(41) He left the lawyer’s oﬃce and drove through a city that was preparing
to make its mark on the new millennium. Couldn’t be bothered with it.
Aslo couldn’t be bothered with lawyers, family conferences or any of
that_ Amira and Babs would give up once they understood they had
no one on their side. They’d have to, especially once they knew about
the birth certificate_ After all, they didn’t really want Kid. It wasn’t
as though they showed any love for her.
(Patricia Grace, Dogside Story, p. 204)
Thus according to my account (Blakemore 2002), the key to the analysis of
well lies in the communicative Principle of Relevance itself : ‘In contrast with
Jucker’s (1993) relevance theoretic account which argues that well encodes
deviation from optimal relevance and hence is an instruction to renegotiate
the context, this account will propose that the information it encodes
amounts to a green light for going ahead with the inferential processes
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involved in the recovery of cognitive eﬀects, and the renegotiation of the
context may be, but is not always, a consequence of interpreting the utter-
ance in accordance with the constraint which well encodes’ (Blakemore 2002:
138; emphasis in the original). If this analysis is right, the use of well is
justified by the speaker’s assumption that the audience needs such a green
light, or, more generally, his aim of directing the audience to the intended
interpretation for a minimum cost in eﬀort. However, in (39) and (40), well is
being used in the representation of a thought which must be attributed to a
character who is not engaged in any form of communicative act.
Similarly, according to my analysis (Blakemore 1987, 2002), the use of
after all indicates that the relevance of the utterance it introduces lies in the
contribution it makes to strengthening an accessible assumption. Thus the
speaker of (42) intends that the hearer will take the proposition in (43a)
together with the proposition in (44b) and derive the proposition in (44c) :
(42) Ben can open Tom’s safe. After all, he knows the combination.
(43) (a) Ben knows the combination for Tom’s safe.
(b) If Ben knows the combination for Tom’s safe, he will be able to
open it.
(c) Ben can open Tom’s safe.
(from Blakemore 2002: 89–90)
The eﬀect of this inference is that the proposition expressed by the first seg-
ment of (42) is held with a degree of strength that is higher than it would have
been prior to the interpretation of the second segment. In other words, ac-
cording to this analysis, after all does not encode a constituent of the prop-
osition expressed by the utterance that contains it, but rather encodes
information about the inferential process which the hearer should use in
deriving its the intended interpretation. In this way, it contributes towards
the optimization of relevance by allowing the speaker to direct the hearer to
the intended interpretation for a minimum cost in eﬀort.
However, as it is used in (41), after all does not introduce an utterance
made by a speaker who is aiming for optimal relevance. There is no speaker
as such – the utterance is simply a representation of the author’s character’s
thoughts which is unmediated by the point of view of the communicating
author. The question, then, is what role is after all playing if it is not directing
an audience to an interpretation intended by a speaker?
As we have seen in section 4, the reward for processing FIT representa-
tions is an impression of having direct access to the thoughts of another. This
is, of course an illusion: the reader only has access to these thoughts via the
public representations which are provided by the author. Nevertheless the
eﬀect of free indirect style is an unmediated view not only of a character’s
thoughts but also of his thought processes. Thus the reader comes to
know not only what a character thinks, but also how they came to have a
thought and what role it plays in the development of new thoughts or in the
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modification of old ones. Similarly, it is not only transparent what a
character decides, but also how they come to make that decision and how it
aﬀects other decisions. Now, a speaker or writer who describing what
someone thinks can provide a conceptual representation of that person’s
thought processes. For example, I could report Linda’s thought processes in
the part of the story from which (39) is extracted thus:
(44) In this part of the story Linda is reflecting upon her lack of maternal
instinct as she sits alone with her youngest child, a baby boy. She seems
to be aware that most people would not be convinced by her revelation
that she had no feeling for her children, particularly by her claim that
she had no love for the baby, and becomes very defensive, demon-
strating just how little she cares for him.
However, this is my interpretation of Linda’s thought processes, and it does
not leave you, the reader, any responsibility for deriving an interpretation of
her mental state. In contrast, the use of well in the free indirect thought
representation in (39), simply imposes a constraint on the relevance of the
thought representation which contains it, and you are free to derive any
interpretation of the thought which is consistent with that constraint. In
particular, you are free to access whatever contextual assumptions you think
would justify this use of well – that is, any contextual assumptions you think
Linda would believe would justify this use of well. According to the analysis
outlined above, these would have to derive from the need to demonstrate
that the baby’s presence does not detract from the plausibility of Linda’s
claims to any lack of maternal feeling, or, more generally, that the answer to
the question ‘what about the baby?’ is indeed relevant. However, the point is
that you have the responsibility to access these assumptions, and are left with
the impression that you have accessed the same assumptions which are ac-
cessed by Linda as she has these thoughts. This contributes to the illusion
that you are participating in her thought processes (in a way which you did
not in (44)) ; and it means that you share in her subsequent unexpected
change of heart and questioning of her own sincerity just a few lines down
the page (I have abridged this passage for convenience here) :
(45) The boy had turned over._ And suddenly his face dimpled; it broke
into a wide, toothless smile, a perfect beam, no less._
‘Why do you keep on smiling?’ she said severely. ‘If you knew what
I was thinking about, you wouldn’t. ’
But he only squeezed his eyes, slyly, and rolled his head on the
pillow. He didn’t believe a word she said._
Linda was so astonished at the confidence of this littlecreature_ Ah
no, be sincere. That was not what she felt ; it was something diﬀerent ; it
was something so new, so_ The tears danced in her eyes [_].
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘At the Bay’, Collected Stories, p. 223)
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Similarly, a speaker/writer could provide (46) as an indirect representation
of Rua’s thought processes in the passage in (41) :
(46) In order to convince himself that he does not need the lawyers in order
to persuade his community to accept that he was Kid’s father, Rua tells
himself that Amira and Babs would give up their claim because they
did not really want or love her.
However, once again, this is my interpretation of Rua’s thought processes,
and, in contrast with (41), it leaves you with no responsibility for recovering
an interpretation of his mental state. Since after all simply imposes a con-
straint on the interpretation of the thought representation which it in-
troduces, you are free to access the contextual assumptions which are needed
in order to derive an interpretation which is consistent with the constraint
it encodes. In particular, you will recall the incidents earlier in the book in
which Kid has been maltreated by Amira and Babs, and consider whether
anyone who treated a child in this way would fight for her custody. And you
will assume that these are the thoughts which are going through Rua’s
mind – even though the author has not represented them in the text. In this
way, you gain the impression that you are participating in his thought
processes – an impression which is not derived from the indirect conceptual
representation in (46).
The analysis of these two examples suggests that the use of discourse
markers which encode procedures in free indirect thought representations
lies in the fact that they allow the reader to take the responsibility for the
recovery of assumptions which are not represented by the author in the text
but which can nevertheless be attributed to the character whose thoughts are
being represented. Since responsibility for the recovery of these assumptions
is given to the reader, and the interpretation of the character’s thoughts is
unmediated by the thoughts of the author who is representing them, s/he is
given the impression that s/he is witnessing the characters mental processes
directly – an impression which cannot be derived from indirect thought rep-
resentations in which characters’ thoughts come already interpreted by a
communicator.
5.2 Expressive interjections and expletives in FIT
As Wharton (2003a, b) shows, the term INTERJECTION has been used to cover
a wide range of phenomena ranging from expressions such as God, Heavens,
Jeepers, damn, which are clearly linguistic, to expressions such as ah, ouch,
wow and boo, which are not clearly linguistic. Terminology is confusing.
Quirk et al. (1985) call expressions such as God, Heavens, etc. expletives, but
note that they are not necessarily used as swearwords. Fludernik (1993) re-
serves the term interjection for lexical constituents such as God, Heavens etc
and includes expressions such as ouch, ah and boo in the category labelled
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‘hesitations’. Although both types of expression fall within her general
category of ‘expressives ’ or ‘subjectivity markers’, neither falls within her
subcategory of ‘addressee-oriented and speaker-oriented expressions ’, which
include such expressions as Sir and Ma’am.
Kaplan’s (1999) paper on the semantics of use, and Wharton’s (2003a, b)
work on interjections would seem to suggest that Fludernik’s sub-
classification of subjectivity markers misses a generalization – a general-
ization which, I shall show, enables us to explain why all of these expressions
play such an important role in free indirect thought representations. As
I have said in the introductory section of this paper, both Kaplan’s approach
to the analysis of expressives (which includes expressions such as damn,
Ma’am and ouch) and Wharton’s analysis of expressions such as ah and wow
might at first sight seem inconsistent with the use of these expressions in
thought representations, since they both seem to assume that they are used in
acts of communication.12 In this section, I shall argue that Wharton’s ap-
proach in which ALL of these expressions encode procedural information
even though they are not all properly linguistic enables us to explain their use
in free indirect thought representations in the same way I have suggested for
discourse markers.
Wharton’s (2003a, b) analysis of interjections such as ah and oh assumes
that they are natural rather than linguistic, and hence are more like an angry
or pleased tone of voice or a surprised facial expression than a word such as
well or after all. At the same time, he argues that along with facial expressions
of surprise, and an angry or pleased tone of voice, these interjections contrast
with natural signs such as dark clouds or footprints in that they have a coded
element which has developed in response to the need to communicate
information to others. While this coded element contrasts with the encoded
meanings of well and after all, in that it is not an input to inferential
processes which result in the recognition of intentions, it is nevertheless like
the meanings of these words in that it is procedural rather than conceptual.
Specifically, it activates the retrieval of a range of propositional attitude
descriptions – a range which might be narrowed in actual use by the use of
particular contextual information, and, in spoken face-to-face discourse, by
the use of facial expressions and prosody.
While this analysis helps explain why interjections such as ah and oh are
natural in the same way as gestures or facial expressions, it also explains
what they have in common with more obviously linguistic expressions such
as good heavens or bother. If Wharton is right, then none of these expressions
encodes a constituent of a thought: they simply activate a range of
[12] The same point applies to Potts’ (2007) analysis of expressive NP epithets and APs. This
paper focuses on the use of expressions such as ah and good heavens ; however, I believe that
the suggestions I make for the use of these expressions in free indirect thought represen-
tations can be applied to expressive NP epithets and APs.
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representations which are assumed to be meta-representations of the
thoughts and emotions of the person who uses them. Moreover, as Wilson &
Wharton (2006) point out, this approach allows us to explain why the
meanings of interjections, facial expressions, or the discourse markers dis-
cussed in section 4 are so elusive, so contextually shaded and so hard to pin
down.13
This, of course, is the key to the role of these expressions in representations
of thought. One of the main challenges for an author who is aiming to give
the impression that a character is acting out his mental state in an immediate
relationship with the reader is to produce utterances which enable the reader
to identify ineﬀable aspects of thought – emotions which cannot be trans-
lated into a public language, attitudes which cannot be expressed directly.
How, for example, is an author to give the reader the impression that s/he has
direct access to the Linda’s thoughts in (45) (above) as she wrestles with the
unfamiliar emotions of motherhood or the strange mixture of excitement
and regret felt by Leila as she prepares for her first ball in (4) (repeated
below)?
(4) Oh, how marvellous to have a brother! In her excitement Leila felt that
if there had been time, if it hadn’t been impossible, she couldn’t have
helped crying because she was an only child and no brother had ever
said ‘Twig?’ to her; no sister would ever say, as Meg said to Jose at that
moment, ‘ I’ve never known your hair go up more successfully than it
has tonight ’.
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘Her First Ball ’, Collected Stories, p. 337)
What the author does, of course, is to produce an expression which encodes a
procedure for activating a range of emotional attitudes. The rest is left to the
reader. Thus the reader of (45) will draw on his experience of reading the
earlier passage in the book (some of which is extracted in (39) above), and his
own imagination to narrow down the range of emotions activated by Linda’s
ah to construct his own particular representation of Linda’s emotional
struggle. Similarly, the reader of (4) is expected to draw on the earlier re-
presentations of Leila’s thoughts as she prepares for the ball and his own
imagination to narrow down the range of emotions activated by oh. In other
words, the fact that these expressions cannot be paraphrased in fixed con-
ceptual terms and interact with the context means that the reader has most of
the responsibility for the interpretation of the thoughts represented, and this
contributes to an impression of emotional immediacy which would not be
recovered from a narrator’s interpretation of those thoughts.
[13] For further discussion of the elusive nature of the meanings of discourse markers, see
Blakemore (2002: 82–83). For discussion of the elusiveness of the meanings of expressive
adjectives and NP epithets, see Potts (2007).
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6. CONCLUS ION
In this paper I have argued that the insights of Banfield’s (1982) ‘no-
narrator’ approach to free indirect style can be accommodated in a relevance
theoretic approach to the representation of thought in fiction. The result is
an account in which the author’s act of revealing a character’s thoughts
communicates a guarantee of optimal relevance – a guarantee which justifies
the eﬀort which the reader invests in deriving meta-representations of
those thoughts from the evidence which the author provides. However, as we
have seen, the reward for this eﬀort is a meta-representation of a character’s
thoughts which is unmediated by the thoughts of the author who is respon-
sible for producing the text. It as if having provided the evidence, the author
then withdraws thus allowing the reader to construct his own interpretation
of the character’s thoughts on the basis of the Principle of Relevance and
contextual assumptions derived from his own interpretation of the sur-
rounding text and his imagination. The result is as Dillon & Kirchhoﬀ (1976)
have described it, an illusion of a character acting out his mental state in an
immediate relationship with the reader.
Within this framework, the use of discourse markers and interjections in
free indirect thought representation contribute to this illusion by imposing
constraints on interpretation which encourage the reader to draw on his own
imagination either to create meta-representations of thoughts which are not
represented in the text or to create meta-representations of otherwise inef-
fable emotions and thoughts. Because these expressions do not encode con-
stituents of conceptual representations, but simply activate processes which
result in conceptual representations, they are particularly eﬀective for an
author who wishes the reader to take responsibility for the interpretation
process. As Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Pilkington (2000) have shown, the
more responsibility the reader/hearer is given for the interpretation process,
the greater the sense of intimacy that is communicated between communi-
cator and audience. The point about free indirect thought representations is,
of course, that there is no communicator speaking in the text, and the inti-
macy that is created by handing the responsibility for interpretation to the
reader is a relationship between reader and (fictional) character.
In this way, then, this paper has shown not just how the use of these
audience-directed expressions is justified in free indirect thought rep-
resentations, but also why they are so eﬀective: their use contributes to the
sense of LISTENING to characters speak their thoughts and grapple with their
emotions – an experience which we cannot have in the real world.
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